Q. What are the principles for grant of ‘ex parte ad-interim Injunction’ under CPC?
Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant–
(a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with–
(i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application;
(ii) a copy of the plaint; and
(iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and
(b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent.”
Therefore, this rule requires the applicant to issue notice to the opposite party before injunction is granted. Though, the Court has power to grant ex parte injunction without issuing notice or hearing the party who will be affected by such order, the said power can be exercised under exceptional circumstances.
It is important to note that where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, i.e., grant of ex parte ad interim injunction the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the objects of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay and require the applicant:
(1) to deliver the opposite party or to send him by registered post immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, copy of the application for injunction along with:
(i) a copy of affidavit filed in support of the application.
(ii) a copy of plaint; and
(iii) copy of documents on which applicant relies.
(2) In Morgan Stanley v. Kartic Das, MANU/SC/0553/1994 : (1994) 4 SCC 225: (1994) 96 Bom LR 933: (1995) 1 Cal LT 18 (SC): (1994) 81 Comp Cas 318 (SO: JT 1994 (3) SC 654: (1994) 2 SCALE 1121: (1994) Supp 1 SCR 136, the Supreme Court indicated the factors which should weigh with the Court in grant of ex parte injunction:
(i) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff,
(ii) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve.
(iii) the Court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented.
(iv) that the Court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant ex parte injunction.
(v) the Court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application.
(vi) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a limited period of time.
(vii) general principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the Court. The purpose of rule 3, Order XXXIX is to enable the opposite party to show cause against issuance of such injunction and if injunction issued without notice, to enable the opposite party to file objections thereto and by this to prevent the petitioner to retain undue advantage of the situation and abuse of the process of law.
In Skyline Education Institute (Pvt.) Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani, MANU/SC/0009/2010 : AIR 2010 SC 3221 the discretion of court in granting of injunction was interpreted as that once the court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience inreparable injury and equity. Unless the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the discretion exercised by the trial court in refusing to entertain the prayer for temporary injunction is vitiated by an error apparent or perversity and manifest injustice has been done, there will be no warrant for exercise of power.
In Manohar Lal v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hira Lal, MANU/SC/0056/1961 : AIR 1962 SC 527: (1962) Supp 1 SCR 450, the issue involved was, i.e., whether the Court could exercise its inherent power when there was specific provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for issuance of injunctions viz. section 94 and Order XXXIX. Relevant portion of section 94 reads “In order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the Court may, if it is so prescribed, grant a temporary injunction.”
In this case: The appellant and the respondent entered into a partnership at Indore for working coal mines at Kajoragram and manufacture of cement, etc., in the name and style of ‘Diamond’ industries. The head office of the partnership was at Indore. The partnership was dissolved by a deed of dissolution. Under the terms of this deed, the appellant made himself liable to render full, correct and true account of all the moneys advanced, by the respondent and also to render accounts of the said partnership and its business. The second proviso at the end of the covenants in the deed of dissolution was “…………….parties entered into the partnership agreement at Indore all disputes and differences whether regarding money or also their rights and liabilities of the parties hereto shall be decided amicably or in court at Indore and no where else.”
The appellant instituted suit in the Court of the subordinate Judge at Asansol against the respondent for the recovery of Rs. 1,00,000 on account of his share in the capital and assets of partnership firm and Rs. 18,000 as interest for detention of the money or as damages or compensation for wrongful withholding of payment. The main ground given by the respondent was that the accounts submitted by the appellant had not been properly kept and that many entries appeared to be wilfully falsified, evidently with mala fide intentions and that there appeared in the account books various false and fictitious entries causing wrongful loss to the respondent and wrongful gain to the appellant. The respondent filed a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act in the Asansol Court praying for the stay of suit in view of Arbitration agreement meanwhile the respondent filed civil suit in the Court of District Judge, Indore against the appellant and prayed for a decree for Rs. 1,90,519 and further interests on the footing of settled account in the alternative for a direction to the appellant to render full and true accounts of the partnership. The respondent applied in the Court at Asansol for the stay of the suit in the exercise of its inherent powers.
In the context of above given facts issue was struck. Has this Court jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit? The Court of Asansol held that there could be no scope for acting under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 had no application to the suit, it having been instituted earlier than the suit at Indore. The High Court of Calcutta confirmed this order.
The Indore Court issued interim injunction under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the appellant restraining him from proceeding with his Asansol suit pending decision of the Indore suit. It may be mentioned here that the respondent didn’t state in his application that his application for the stay of suit at Asansol had been finally dismissed by the High Court of Calcutta. Against the order of Indore Court the appellant went in appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Madhya Bharat.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. The learned Judges agreed with the contention that Order XXXIX didn’t apply to the facts of the case. They, however held that the order of injunction could be issued in the exercise of inherent powers of the Court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is against this order that the appellant preferred this appeal by special leave.
The Supreme Court observed as follows:
(i) It is well-settled that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them.
(ii) No party has a right to insist on the Court’s exercising inherent jurisdiction and the Court exercises it only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the end of justice to do so. The powers are to be exercised in exceptional circumstances for which court lays down no procedure.
(iii) There is no such expression in section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code likewise there is nothing in Order XXXIX which provides specifically that temporary injunction is not to be issued in the cases which are not mentioned in those rules.
(iv) Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 itself says that nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice.
(v) The inherent power has not been confirmed upon the Court, it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it Further, when the Code itself recognises the existences of the inherent power of the Court there is no question of implying the powers outside the limits of this Code.
(vi) The case would be different where the rights of an individual are affected. In such cases, the specific provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are to be used without any intervention by way of inherent powers of the Court. Inherent powers are not the powers over the substantive rights which any litigant possess but the same may definitely be used for procedural matter such as a case of grant of temporary injunctions.
The Court held that the suit at Indore which had been instituted later could be stayed in view of section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The provisions of that section are clear, definite and mandatory. A court in which subsequent suit has been filed is prohibited from proceeding with the trial of the suit in certain specified circumstances. When there is a special provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing with the contingencies of two such suits being instituted, recourse to the inherent powers under section 151 is not justified.
Shah, J. agreed with the conclusions that the appeal must succeed but he did not agree with the view that the Civil Courts have inherent jurisdiction in cases not covered by Order XXXIX.
In Thomson Press (I) Ltd. v. M/s Advertising Plus, 80 (1999) DLT 648 Order III, rules 1 and 2 were in issue. Removal of staircase, errected in open space on road side. Stair-case constructed without permission of MCD is liable to be removed. Defendant directed to remove staircase erected in open space on road side within two months. In event of failure to do so MCD, shall remove. As the said stair-case constructed by the dependent without its permission of the MCD. It was held that the plaintiff not to create any obstruction or hindrance for defendant in use of existing staircase on back side of property.
Interlocutory Orders
Interlocutory orders are orders passed by a court during the pendency of a suit. Such orders are made vis-a-vis a suit while it is receiving the active consideration of the Court and before the final adjudication upon subject-matter of suit. They relate to matters of procedure as they arise during the trial of the suit or in the course of execution proceedings. They are passed to assist the parties in the prosecution of their case, or for the purpose of protecting the subject-matter of the suit or for ensuring the determination of the merits of the case. They, however, do not determine the substantive rights of the parties in respect of subject-matter of the suit.
Thus, like temporary injunction, interlocutory orders are intended to prevent the ends of justice from being frustrated (by the acts of parties to a suit). Rules 6 to 10 of Order XXXIX mention certain interlocutory orders. The Court has the power to order interim sale of movable property (subject-matter of suit) which is subject to speedy and natural decay (rule 6). It can order for the detention, preservation or inspection of any property (subject-matter of suit (rule 7). Order directing the appointment of a receiver also fall within the meaning of interlocutory orders.
Modi Entertainment Network v. W.S.G. Cricket P.T.E. Ltd., (2003) 1 SCALE 388: MANU/SC/0039/2003 : AIR 2003 SC 1177: 2003 (1) Arb LR 533 (SC): 2003 (1) CTC 429: JT 2003 (1) SC 382: (2003) 2 MLJ 98 (SC): (2003) 4 SCC 341: (2003) 1 SCR 480, in this case the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the following principles:
(1) In exercising discretion to grant an anti-suit injunction the Court must be satisfied of the following aspects; (a) the defendant, against whom injunction is sought, is amenable to the personal jurisdiction of the Court; (b) if the injunction is declined the ends of justice will be defeated and injustice will be perpetuated; and (c) the principle of comity-respect for the Court in which the commencement or continuance of action/proceeding is sought to be restrained-must be borne in mind;
(2) in a case where more forums than one are available, the court in exercise of its discretion to grant anti-suit injunction will examine as to which is the appropriate forum (forum conveniens) having regard to the convenience of the parties and may grant anti-suit injunction in regard to proceeding which are oppressive or vexatious or in a forum non-convenience;
(3) where jurisdiction of a court is invoked on the basis of jurisdiction clause in a contract, the recitals therein in regard to exclusive or nonexclusive jurisdiction of the Court of choice of the parties are not determinative but are relevant factors and when a question arises as to the nature of jurisdiction agreed to between the parties the Court has to decide the same on a true interpretation of the contract on the facts and circumstances of each case;
(4) a court of natural jurisdiction will not normally grant anti-suit injunction against a defendant before it where parties have agreed to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a court including a foreign court, a forum of their choice in regard to the commencement or continuance of proceedings in the Court of choice, save in an exceptional case for goods and sufficient reasons, with a view to prevent injustice in circumstances such as which permit a contracting party to be relieved of the burden of the contract; or since the date of the contract the circumstances or subsequent events have made it impossible for the party seeking injunction to prosecute the case in the Court of choice because the essence of the jurisdiction of the Court does not exist or because of a vis major or force majeure and the like.
(5) where parties have agreed, under a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, to approach a neutral foreign forum and be governed by the law applicable to it for the resolution of their disputes arising under the contract, ordinarily no anti-suit injunction will be granted in regard to proceedings in such a forum conveniens and favoured forum as it shall be presumed that the parties have thought over their convenience and all other relevant factors before submitting to nonexclusive jurisdiction of the Court of their choice which cannot be treated just an alternative forum;
(6) a party to the contract containing jurisdiction clause cannot normally be prevented from approaching the Court of choice of the parties as it would amount to aiding breach of the contract; yet when one of the parties to the jurisdiction clause approaches the Court of choice in which exclusive, or non-exclusive jurisdiction is created, the proceedings in that Court cannot per se be treated as vexatious or oppressive nor can the Court be said to be forum non-conveniens; and
(7) the burden of establishing that the forum of choice is a forum non-conveniens or the proceedings therein are oppressive or vexatious would be on the party so contending to aver and prove the same.
In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, MANU/SC/0056/1993 : AIR 1993 SC 276: (1992) 2 MLJ 49 (SC): 1992 (1) UJ 501 (SC).
It was observed that:
Order XXXIX, rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant threatens to disposses the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing…….. or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the Court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause (c) was brought on statute by section 88(i)(c) of the Amending Act 104 of 1966 with effect from 1st February, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power except the inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to grant ad interim injunction against dispossession. Rule 1 primarily concerns with the preservation of the property in dispute till legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the Court in exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to preserve the subject-matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the Court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the Court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the Court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensure before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it.